Quasi-markets targets and the evaluation of nursing-home funding in the Valencian Region by Fuenmayor Fernández, Amadeo et al.
Hacienda Pública Española / Review of Public Economics, 216-(1/2016): 13-38
© 2016, Instituto de Estudios Fiscales
DOI: 10.7866/HPE-RPE.16.1.1
Quasi-markets Targets and the Evaluation of Nursing-home 





Received: May, 2014 
Accepted: April, 2015
Abstract
Spanish long term care is in danger, therefore we propose a change in the nursing home funding sys-
tem. We use as an example the extremely complex nursing home financing system of Valencian Region. 
In this region, there are many funding mechanisms: two types of public subsidies, two different acces-
sibility plans, a voucher scheme and a cash benefit approach related to residential service. We evaluate 
these methods through the quasi-market theory. We find that these approaches have negative impact on 
equity, efficiency and freedom of choice and we propose a new, homogeneous financing method for all 
nursing homes through voucher.
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1. Introduction
Care for elderly people in Spain has drastically changed in recent years, moving from a 
means-tested benefits social care system to a universal care system for both the aged and the 
dependent. This change resulted in the Dependency Law1, implemented in 2007, with the 
aim of providing proper care for all dependents. Dependence can strike at any age, but ac-
cording to official data2, 76.1 per cent of beneficiaries are over 65 years old, while those 
over 80 represent 54.6 per cent of total dependents.
Although the Dependency Law is applied throughout Spain as a whole, the development 
and implementation of the scheme are the responsibility of the Regional Governments. Fun-
ding for these services and benefits is shared between Central and Regional Governments. 
Each region, apart from funding, has to determine and evaluate citizens’ level of dependence, 
services and benefits available to them, as well as the control of the services supplied. The-
refore, the implementation of the Dependency Law will undoubtedly be different across 
the 17 autonomous regions of Spain3 and at present is experiencing important financial 
problems (Barriga et al., 2013 and 2014; FED, 2014). These local and regional variations 
also arise in many European countries (Fersch and Jensen, 2011).
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The Dependency Law provides various services and benefits for dependents. However, 
in Spain residential care remains one of the most sought after options, especially for elderly 
people with a high level of dependency. To develop residential services, each region has 
designed its own system. The Valencian system is quite complex, including different finan-
cing methods such as vouchers, cash benefits, and subsidies to centers.
We will analyse the Valencian system on the basis of quasi-market theory. From the 
Homo economicus rationale, some economists believe that the best strategy to success in 
economic life is to look for efficiency (Cohen, 2014). Following this objective there should 
be a frequent competence among individuals and centers that would lead prices down and 
consumers would have more choice. It seems there are no limits of application of this ratio-
nale and it can be appropriate to apply to any good or service, in any field and also could be 
practiced in the public sector.
Quasi-markets have their origin in the 80s when the British Government carried out reforms 
in its welfare state that accounted for changes in the structure of services such as health, educa-
tion, housing and social services. These reforms were studied initially by Le Grand and Bartlett 
(1993) and Le Grand (2003; 2007). The quasi-markets have as their main characteristic the 
substitution of bureaucratic mechanisms of production, allocation and distribution by competi-
tive elements, freedom of choice and quality fostering. Despite having common features with 
competitive markets, quasi-markets have their own particularities. On the supply side, service 
financing and regulation correspond to the public sector, while service production can be perfor-
med by public, private or joint action of both providers, but always in a competitive environ-
ment. On the demand side, users express their preferences through prices, but demand is exer-
cised in two ways: through agents acting on behalf of consumers; or by consumers themselves 
who will choose the provider, and the government will be responsible for financing the service. 
In addition to these objectives, equity, understood as equal opportunity in access to services (and 
not related to the redistribution of intergenerational transfers, gender burden or household inco-
me), has also appeared as a purpose in many studies on quasi-markets (Granell, 2002).
The eldercare was one of those services in which these quasi-markets initiatives were 
introduced. Furthermore, quasi-markets have been considered by governments as an alterna-
tive of public services financing, hoping to reduce public expenditure and prices among 
nursing-homes, and to achieve better quality and equity (Kähkönen, 2004; Hansen, 2010). 
Until now, many experts have focused their studies on these topics but without finding clear 
effects (Forder and Allan, 2011; Forder and Allan, 2014; Rostgaard and Szebehely, 2012; 
Meagher and Szebehely, 2013). Spain is also introducing some elements of competition in 
social services for elderly people.
In this paper we analyse the funding of residential care, focusing on the Valencian Region, 
which has developed a very complex financing system. After this introduction, in the second 
section, we describe the services and benefits under the Dependency Law with regard to resi-
dential care. In the third section we present our main hypothesis: during past twenty years, the 
Valencian Region has experienced a process of ‘marketization’, a common process in other 
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countries (Brennan et al., 2012). To show that, we describe the mechanisms of public funding 
for nursing-homes facilities that have been introduced in this region. In the fourth section we 
assess the entire financial system following quasi-market theory as part of main changes in 
“models of care”. In the fifth section, we develop a proposal to improve equity, freedom of 
choice and efficiency, and finally outline our key findings.
2. Services and benefits of the Dependency Law
Pavolini and Ranci (2008), analyzing the Long Term Care reforms introduced in several 
European countries (France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK), stressed 
several common characteristics: a tendency to combine monetary transfers and in-kind benefits, 
the introduction of funding measures to encourage care within the family, the introduction of 
competition in the social care market, and the empowerment of users through a higher purcha-
sing power. As we will see in this section, the former two characteristics (monetary and in-kind 
benefits, and family care) are the core of Spanish Dependency Law, while the two latter (com-
petition and empowerment of users) are two guidelines specifically aimed in Valencian Region.
The main goal of the Dependency Law is to cater for the individual needs of dependents 
and establishes in-kind benefits and monetary benefits. The first ones must be used first and 
foremost. Not being possible to use these in-kind benefits, the monetary benefit could be 
used4. There are five different types of services, depending on the needs of each person: 
Services for Dependency Prevention, Tele-Alarm, Home-Help, Day Center / Night Center, 
and Nursing-Homes. It also provides financial benefits for those in need. There are three 
types of economic benefits:
• Cash benefit linked to residential services. The dependent person pays the provider 
directly and then receives a financial benefit which covers part of this cost. This 
benefit is typically used when the dependent person is not satisfied with the range of 
services offered by the administration, and prefers a different provider. The provi-
sion may include any of the aforementioned services: Tele-Alarm, Home-Help, Day 
Center/Night Center, or Nursing-Homes.
• Cash benefit for a family carer. A family member cares for the dependent person and 
receives a benefit from the Administration.
• Cash benefit for personal care. Similar to previous case, although the caregiver in 
this case is a social care professional.
Dependency protection is financed on three different levels. Firstly, the “Minimum Level of 
Protection”, which is in charge of Central Government. According to the National Audit Office 
(Tribunal de Cuentas, 2013, p. 93), in 2010 Central Government expenses amounted to 81.8 
million euros for Valencian Region. Secondly, the “Agreed Level of Protection”, which is shared 
between central and regional authorities, being the percentages different in each region and each 
year. In 2010, the central government contribution to Valencian Region reached 25.3 million 
euros, while the Valencian government contribution meant 272 million euros (Tribunal de 
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Cuentas, 2013, p. 93). Thirdly, each region devoted supplementary funds to the “Additional 
Level of Protection”. At any level, the user must also contribute, according with her level of 
income. In 2010 the total dependency net expenditure (after several internal adjustments) in the 
Valencian Region was 405.5 million euros, having paid the central government 126.4 million 
euros and Valencian authorities 279.2 million euros (Tribunal de Cuentas, 2013, p. 114).
The share between Central and Regional governments varies across regions (being the 
regional percentage at least 50%). This disparity between regions is due to the financing 
system derived from the Dependency Law (Consejo Económico y Social, 2013). Central 
Government financing (mainly through the Minimum Level of Protection) is always the 
same, no matter if the user receives a benefit or a service. This amount solely varies accor-
ding to the degree and level of user dependency. However, regional financing is different if 
the user receives a financial benefit or a service (usually higher in the latter case). The regions 
that recognize more services (Madrid, 89.50% and Valencia, 63.20% in 2010) are situated 
among those regions with higher share of regional financing (Madrid, 72.83% and Valencia, 
68.84% in 20105), while the regions recognizing more financial benefits have less need of 
funds. For this reason, the National Audit Office states that Central Government (IMSERSO) 
should analyze the possibility of changing the financial model (Tribunal de Cuentas, 2013, 
p. 113). Showing the reduction of percentage of participation of Central Government in the 
financing of services, Barriga et al. (2014, p.22) state that we “are witnessing a gradual 
withdrawal of central government effort”. Table 1 shows current data on dependency in the 
Valencian Region, compared to the rest of Spain.
Table 1
DEPENDENCY STATISTICS IN THE VALENCIAN REGION AND SPAIN, NOVEMBER 2013
Valencian Region Spain
Number % Number %
  Total Population at 1/11/2013 5,129,266  10.85 47,265,321 –
Cash benefits and services recipients 42,078 0.8 754,244 1.5
 a) Dependency Prevention 353 0.73 21,082 2.2
 b) Tele-alarm 9,795 20.25 121,926 12.8
 c) Home-Help 0 0.0 120,926 12.7
 d) Day Center/Night Center 3,434 7.1 69,184 7.3
 e) Nursing-homes 11,434 23.6 131,616 13.9
 f) Cash benefit related to residential services 3,593 7.4 71,234 7.5
 g) Cash benefit for a family carer 19,753 40.8 409,598 43.2
 h) Cash benefit for personal care 2 0.0 1,287 0.1
  Total Cash benefits and services 48,364 100 946,351 100
Source: Own elaboration from Dependency system data. Available online at http://www.dependencia.imserso.es/
dependencia_01/estadisticas/inf_gp/2013/index.htm
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The most common benefit applied in Spain is Cash Benefit for a Family Carer, which in 
2013 accounted for 43.2 per cent of benefits (López and del Pozo, 2010). In an environment 
of economic crisis, families of dependents may choose to receive a financial allowance and 
save the cost of a residential facility. Nursing-homes make up the second largest number of 
beneficiaries; here the relative importance in the Valencian Region (23.6 per cent) is much 
higher than the national average (13.9 per cent). Residential care is mainly provided for el-
derly people with a higher dependency degree. In 2011, 23.48% of users with Degree III, 
Level 2 (DIII-L2) of dependency received residential care; in the case of DIII-L1 the percen-
tage was 15.73%; for DII-L2, a 10.76%; and for DII-L1, just an 8.83% individuals receiving 
public assistance were eligible for residential care (IMSERSO, 2011, p. 18).
Moreover, residential care accounts for a much higher amount of resources than other 
benefits. The number or users is quite high, but the cost per user is the greatest among benefits 
and services. For this reason, according to Barriga et al. (2014), residential care goes to 16.2% 
to elderly people, but uses 51.1% of total resources. On the opposite side, the Cash Benefit 
for a Family Career reaches 50.8% of people, and consumes 23.8% of resources.
The residential sector has greatly expanded in recent years due to growing demand. In 
December 2012, there were 5,533 nursing-homes in Spain with a total of 353,642 places 
available, accounting for 4.2 per cent of the population over 65 years of age. However, this 
ratio varies considerably among regions. (CSIC, 2013).
3. Public financing of nursing-homes. The case of the Valencian Region
In this section we will focus only on residential services in the Valencian Region, and 
the way they are financed by the regional authorities. Two main goals could be stressed in 
public policy related to nursing-homes: the introduction of competition in the social care 
market, and the empowerment of users through a higher purchasing power (Pavolini and 
Ranci, 2008). As a result, the distribution of nursing-home centers is represented in Table 2.
Table 2
NUMBER OF NURSING-HOMES CENTERS AND PLACES IN THE VALENCIAN REGION, 2013
Centers % Places % Average Size
Public 68 20.36 5,497 20.76 81
 Regional Government 40 11.98 4,006 15.13 100
 Municipal 28 8.38 1,491 5.63 53
Private 266 79.64 20,984 79.24 79
 Non-profit 39 11.68 3,188 12.04 82
 For-profit 227 67.96 17,796 67.2 78
  Total 334 100 26,481 100 79
Source: Own elaboration from Portal Mayores data. Available online at http://envejecimiento.csic.es/recursos/resi-
dencias/index.htm
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The number of private nursing-homes in the Valencian Region is larger than public faci-
lities, representing 79 per cent of centers and available places. The average size of centers, 
both private and public, is around 80 places. Within public nursing-homes two types of cen-
ters should be distinguished: those belonging to the Regional Government and those which 
are owned by municipalities. The former group is greater and centers are usually quite large 
(100 places), whereas municipal centers have a lower average size (53 places) (CSIC, 2013).
As for private centers, these can be divided into either for-profit or non-profit nursing-
homes. The non-profit centers often have distinctive characteristics: most are linked to the 
Catholic Church; they are usually older centers and have a lower average size. Profit centers, 
have been the most widely developed in recent years, accounting for nearly 67 per cent of 
the places available in the Valencian Region.
Originally nursing-homes in Spain could operate thanks to the selfless work of volunteers 
and religious orders (third sector) as well as from contributions made by residents’ families 
(private financing). However, this pattern has changed dramatically since 1975, with the begin-
ning of the democratic period in Spain. As a result the public sector began to provide, regulate, 
and fund social care services; firstly through the creation of public nursing-homes, and secondly 
through the financing of private centers either through public-private contracts or subsidies. The 
public financing system of residential places has always been complex. However, this comple-
xity has increased noticeably following the adoption of the Dependency Law in 2007.
In order to receive a place funded by the public sector, the elderly person must apply for 
dependency recognition, expressing their preference for nursing-homes by indicating their three 
preferred centers. If the assessment is positive, the Regional Administration will recognize a de-
gree of dependence, will propose an “Individual Care Program”, trying to respect the preferences 
of the beneficiary, and will specify the nursing-home assigned by the administration. Requested 
and assigned centers can pertain to any of the four types discussed below, each funded differently: 
public nursing-homes (regional or local) and private nursing-homes (profit or non-profit).
In the four types of centers, the public sector apparently bears the full cost of service. 
However, the dependent person has to pay a public price to the Regional Government for the 
service delivery. This public price, regulated by the Valencian Authorities since 19936, ranges 
between 80 per cent and 95 per cent of the user’s family monthly per capita income. This is 
a public price that increases with income, as shown in Table 3.
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Table 3
PUBLIC PRICES FOR NURSING-HOME PLACES IN VALENCIAN REGION, 
DEPENDING ON THE PCMI
Per capita monthly income 
(PCMI) 
Monthly price Monthly price interval
Less or equal to 240.40€ 80% PCMI 0 – 192.32€
Between 240.41 and 390.66€ 83% PCMI – 6.01€ 193.53 - 324.25€
Between 390.67 and 540.91 € 85% PCMI – 6.01 € 326.06 – 453.76 €
Between 540.92 and 691.16 € 87% PCMI – 12.02 € 458.58 – 589.29 €
Between 691.17 and 814.42 € 90% PCMI – 18.03 € 604.02 – 714.95 €
Between 814.43 and 991.67 € 93% PCMI – 30.05 € 727.36 – 892.20 €
Between 991.68 and 1,141.92 € 95% PCMI – 36.06 € 906.04 – 1,048.76 €
More than 1,141.92 € PCMI – 90.15 € 1,051.78 €  
Source: Decreto 23/1993, de 8 de febrero, del Govern Valencià, por el que regula los precios públicos correspondien-
tes a centros y servicios del Institut Valencià de Serveis Socials. (DOCV nº 1.995 de 31 de marzo de 1993).
If the dependent person prefers to be served in another residential facility, not included 
in the public offer, then she has another choice. She can apply for the Cash Benefit linked to 
Residential Services (CBRS). In these cases, the elderly person chooses where she would like 
to live and pays the center directly. Subsequently, she will receive this financial benefit from 
the Regional Administration.
Now we review the most important features of the five existing funding mechanisms, 
including the CBRS. Its evolution over time is summarized in Figure 1.
Figure 1. Evolution of public financing for nursing-homes in the Valencian Region
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As we will see, in the past decades, a process of marketization has been developed in the 
Valencian nursing-home sector. The process of marketization has two dimensions (Anttonen 
and Meagher, 2013). Firstly, competition could be used to organize service provision, includ-
ing for-profit and non-profit providers. In the Valencian Region it was introduced through 
subsidies to non-profit centers and through the nursing-home voucher. Secondly, the private 
sector rationalities and practices are imported into the public sector, introducing competition 
between public centers. This second dimension was introduced through Comprehensive 
Management in public centers, besides Public Management.
3.1. Public nursing-homes owned by the Valencian Government
Public financing of residential places in the Valencian Region began in the early demo-
cratic period, using the most common method at that time: the creation of public centers. 
Those public nursing-homes, which were owned by the Regional Administration, were in-
tended to be an alternative to the private non-profit centers existing to date. The public care 
network became increasingly important over time, and today there are 40 centers offering a 
total of 4,006 places. During the first years of operation, these residences could be regarded 
as completely public centers, as the provision, production of the service (staff, facilities, 
activities), financing and regulation were entirely the responsibility of the Regional Admi-
nistration. However, in 1998 a process of marketization began and some nursing-homes were 
then managed by private entities (Brennan et al., 2012). So, while the provision, financing 
and regulation of the service remained the responsibility of Regional Government, the run-
ning of the service passed into private hands. These centers became known as “Comprehen-
sive Management Centers”. The main argument to justify this marketization was to improve 
the efficiency of centers due to lower costs in providing the service. The number of these 
centers has steadily increased over time; but there still remain fully public institutions. Cu-
rrently, only 12 public nursing-homes are managed by the Regional Authorities, while the 
remaining 27 are Comprehensive Management Centers (CSIC, 2013).
Regardless of the management model, all public centers are funded by the Regional 
Administration. Public managed nursing-homes are directly funded through the budget, 
while the Comprehensive Management Centers receive a transfer from the Regional Admi-
nistration, which varies depending on the “Fee per Place and Day” agreed with each com-
pany in each individual contract. In 2012, these fees ranged between € 54.94 and € 76.75, 
with an average cost of € 60.95.
3.2. Subsidies to nursing-homes
Grants aimed at residential centers have existed since 1987 and still remain one of the 
main means of financing for nursing-homes. This grant scheme, aimed both at centers owned 
by municipalities and at private non-profit centers, allowed the Regional Authorities to 
supplement the public network with additional places for users who could not cope with the 
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private cost of residential care. This method was chosen because there was no need to build 
new residences, as there was already a strong network of non-profit centers, mostly linked to 
the Catholic Church. To qualify for such aid, centers must be licensed by Regional Authori-
ties and must belong to a non-profit association. Private for-profit centers cannot apply for 
these grants, among which we can find Social Accessibility Centers, which are discussed 
below. The amount paid to nursing-homes in 2012 is €50 per subsidized place and day7.
The main advantage of the grant scheme is that the Regional Authority can ensure a 
relatively low cost (€ 50 per day) per user. These nursing-homes meet all legal requirements 
related to facilities and staff. In addition, for many of these centers, the altruistic work of 
religious and secular volunteers contributes to greater attention to the residents. However, the 
subsidy scheme has two clear disadvantages. First, the “Fee per Place and Day” criterion 
does not discriminate on the basis of user characteristics, as it doesn’t take into account the 
level of dependence of residents, nor their purchasing power. Second, these grants are awar-
ded annually and renewal is not guaranteed, creating great uncertainty for both nursing-ho-
mes and users alike. Finally, the financial criterion does not allow an equitable treatment to 
for-profit and non-profit centers.
3.3. Nursing-Home Voucher
The voucher is a characteristic mechanism in quasi-markets. It was originally proposed 
by Friedman (1962), and has been used in the marketization of public services, like educa-
tion (Levin, 1992), health (Chalkley and Malcomson, 1996), housing and social services 
(Cave, 2001). There are not many experiences of vouchers in residential care. Pavolini and 
Ranci (2008) mentioned some cases in the Centre-North Italy, and a Swedish quasi-voucher 
mechanism. FORTÍN (2002) examines some advantages and disadvantages of vouchers in 
the area of residential care.
The mechanism of vouchers was first used in Valencian nursing-homes in 19968. Bene-
ficiaries receive a monthly voucher from Regional Authorities which users pass on to their 
chosen nursing-home. Subsequently, the center sends these vouchers to the Regional Gover-
nment and exchanges them for money. If a center wishes to participate in this program it 
must apply formally. Once approved the center is recognized as a “Member Center of Nur-
sing-Home Voucher Program” and offers the Administration a certain number of places to be 
occupied by beneficiaries within this program. The Member Centers may be municipal pu-
blic centers, private for-profit centers (including Social Accessibility Centers) and non-profit 
private nursing-homes. The only centers that cannot participate in this program are the public 
homes owned by Regional Authorities.
Since the implementation of the Nursing-Home Voucher System in 1996 until 2007, any 
elderly person could apply for the voucher, whether they had benefited from the program in 
previous years or not. However, from 2008 onwards, due to the implementation of Dependen-
cy Law, the voucher becomes an extinguishing mechanism to be gradually replaced by Cash 
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Benefit Linked to Residential Services. Since 2008, the voucher can only be requested by those 
who were already beneficiaries in previous years. That is, vouchers are no longer awarded to 
new users and only those beneficiaries who already held one of these places can still avail 
themselves of it. In any case, vouchers are renewed annually, but users have no guarantee of 
renewal in the future. Since 2008 Nursing-Home Voucher amount is calculated as follows:
Monthly Voucher Amount = Place Cost - Beneficiary Contribution.
Where:
• The place cost is not a homogeneous quantity, as it increases with the degree of de-
pendency of the elderly person. In 2012 the amount was between € 39.47 per day 
and € 57.70 per day9.
• Beneficiary Contribution: the user must deal with a public price for the service. The 
public price is the same as in public housing and in subsidized centers (see Table 3).
To understand the advantages of the voucher scheme one must think back to 1996, when 
the initiative began. At that time the public sector could not cope with the sharp increase in 
demand for residential places. One possible solution was to build new public centers or sub-
sidized new private centers, but this possibility would only have long-term effects and the 
waiting list in public centers was such a problem that an immediate solution was required. 
At the same time, many private nursing-homes could not fill all available places because their 
prices were too high for many potential users. The nursing-home voucher was therefore a 
useful mechanism to mitigate both problems simultaneously. On the one hand, it served to 
reduce waiting lists in public and subsidized centers; on the other hand, it allowed many 
private nursing-homes to increase their occupancy, hire new workers and improve their fi-
nancial viability (Tortosa and Granell, 2002).
Since its introduction, the voucher scheme also had features that favored equity both bet-
ween centers attached to the program, and between users. Firstly, it is a public financing method 
open to all accredited centers, which receive the same support for place and month regardless of 
their characteristics (religious / secular, for-profit / non-profit, public / private, etc.). As for users, 
the criteria of both horizontal equity and vertical equity are met: the granting of the voucher 
depends on the level of need and the amount awarded increases with the level of dependency of 
the user. Finally, the voucher system has also served to achieve one of the main objectives of 
quasi-markets: increasing the power of center choice by users. And this in turn may enable el-
derly people to select those centers nearest to their homes or their families.
As for criticisms, it is doubtful if users can truly exercise real freedom of choice or if it 
is in fact the center that chooses the user. The success of that power of choice will depend on 
the definition of both voucher components: place cost and beneficiary contribution. Further, it 
must be stressed that voucher quantity depends on the amount budgeted, so not all who meet 
the requirements will finally receive the financial aid, but only those who obtain higher scores 
on the scale. Its annual renewal is also criticized, as it does not guarantee the perception of 
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support to the border user. Finally, administrative costs of voucher management have also 
been criticized. Although the user is responsible for most of the steps, the Administration also 
has to negotiate with many different nursing-homes that have diverse characteristics as well 
as having to assess the personal and economic circumstances of users every year.
3.4. Social Accessibility Places
The development of these residential places has its origin in the Access to Residential 
Places Program in 200110, which envisaged the creation of 9,000 new residential places by 
private companies, whereby the Regional Government committed to financing up to a third 
of them. The program was put out to tender and subsequently was awarded to 13 companies, 
who agreed to build new residential facilities and then make up to a third of the new places 
available to the Regional Government. These commitments were reflected in administrative 
contracts signed by the Administration with each of the successful tenderers. The contracts 
have a 15 year term from the beginning of the service, and may be extended to a maximum 
of 25 years. The contracts also include the price the successful tenderers will charge for each 
of the Social Accessibility Places and will be reviewed annually for changes in the RPI. In 
relation to fees per place and day received by these nursing-homes, there is no uniform 
amount, but depends on each individual contract, ranging from € 50.86 to € 57.36 in 2012. 
In late 2007 there was a legislative change, tripling the number of Social Accessibility Places 
awarded in the 2001 auction (2nd Access to Residential Places Program, or ACC2). This 
increase was effected through new management contracts signed with the same companies. 
Each contract also sets a price for the new places, higher than those paid for the previous 
places. This new fee, identical for all nursing-homes, was € 58.30 in 2012.
As for the advantages of this system, the creation of Centers of Social Accessibility came 
about due to the high demand for places in recent years. Thanks to Accessibility Centers, the 
supply of places in different areas of the region has been extended significantly, although this 
increase could have been achieved too through the building of new public and also non-
profit nursing-homes. In addition, these Accessibility nursing-homes have inputs and human 
resources beyond the legal requirements demanded by the Regional Government. The main 
advantage of Accessibility Centers for regional authorities is its lower cost. First, the cons-
truction and equipment of centers is provided by the successful tenderers, saving this invest-
ment to the Government. Second, the fee per place and day the Regional Government must 
pay (between €50.86 and € 58.30) is significantly less than the cost of public places in 
Comprehensive Management Centers (€ 60.95, on average).
However, Accessibility Centers have also been strongly criticized. The most common 
criticism has to do with the exclusive advantages of these centers. The fact that some com-
panies won a public competition in 2001, has given them an advantage when competing with 
other organizations and companies, as they have guaranteed public funding for an important 
part of their places (between 33 per cent and 100 per cent) during a period of up to 25 years. 
The process of marketization was similar to one developed in Sweden at the beginning of the 
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1990s. It was a process of competitive tendering for large nursing-homes and geographical 
areas. According to Brennan et al. (2012, p. 381), this procedure “is important in explaining 
the oligopolistic structure of private sector provision”. Other criticisms have been expressed 
relating to the characteristics of the successful tenderers and the nursing-homes built. The 
level of concentration is very high, as 43 of the 50 Centers of Social Accessibility are owned 
by four major companies that have greater power when negotiating the economic conditions 
with Valencian Regional Authorities. Furthermore, Accessibility Centers are characterized 
by their large size, with an average of 129 places. This may result in lower costs per place, 
but, maybe, in less personalized attention for residents or in displacement as the centers were 
mainly built in the suburbs.
3.5. Cash Benefit Linked to Residential Services
The Cash Benefit Linked to Residential Services (CBRS) is one of the financial aids in 
the Dependency Law. Its requirements and conditions are regulated in the Valencian Region 
since 200711. The main feature of this provision is its residual character, as it is recognized 
only when there is no residential care available through the public and private network of 
Valencian nursing-homes. This may occur when there are no available places in public or 
subsidized centers, when the elderly person does not like the centers offered, or when the 
user has already lived in another non-contracted private center and wants to continue being 
treated there.
Nursing-homes that want to participate in this program must be accredited by the Regio-
nal Government, which opens the range of centers to those already seen in the Nursing-
Home Voucher: centers owned by municipalities, private for-profit centers (including Social 
Accessibility Centers) and non-profit private nursing-homes. The only non-eligible residen-
ces are Public Centers owned by the Regional Government. The CBRS has been designed as 
a replacement to the voucher scheme. Voucher recipients in previous years had two options: 
to renew the voucher annually or get the CBRS, which has the advantage of being indefinite 
in time. In addition to the unlimited period, this benefit differs from the voucher scheme in 
two ways:
• The economic benefit is paid by the Government directly to the user. Residents must 
address the total cost of residential place (with their own resources and the amount 
of the benefit).
• The cost of residential places is not set by the public sector, as is the case with vou-
chers. This characteristic allows centers to charge the user whatever price they want.
The maximum benefit is the same in the whole Spain and depends on the degree and 
level of dependency recognized. However, this maximum quantity is reduced in the Valen-
cian Region based on the economic capacity of the elderly people, as measured by per capi-
ta income of the family unit. Table 4 summarizes all funding mechanisms that currently exist. 
It includes information about which nursing-homes can profit from each of these mecha-
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nisms, the number of places supported with each of them and also the amount received by 
the center in each case. The last row shows the daily public price per user.
Table 4
PUBLIC FINANCING MECHANISMS FOR NURSING-HOMES IN VALENCIAN REGION, 2012
PUBLIC FINANCING MECHANISMS













Municipal centers X X X X
Social Accessibility X X X
(only for-profit centers)
Private non-profit X X X
Remaining private centers X X X
Places Financed 3,892 2,971 7,106 3,974 3,039
Place Cost 54.94-76.75 50 39.47-57.70 50.86-58.30 Variable
Source: Own elaboration.
4. Financing system evaluation from the theory of quasi-markets
Quasi-markets elements have been introduced progressively in eldercare of developed 
countries (UK, Nordic countries, Canada, etc.). European Commission (2012) has noted that 
elderly care marketization is increasing in many European Countries (Meagher and Szebe-
hely, 2013).
The introduction of different mechanisms of public financing enhances private providers 
to enter in eldercare. Such participation pretends to create competition with public suppliers 
and to gain in efficiency and greater choice for users. However, there is a lack of economic 
evaluations of these initiatives to find if targets are met. Although the composition of supply 
sometimes has turned into an oligopoly (Brennan et al., 2012), it remains to prove the most 
important aspects of efficiency such as the reduction of nursing-homes prices and the impro-
vement of quality of these services. This is one of the most important challenges in this 
process since information of elder services is scarce, especially on results and quality (Knapp 
et al., 2001). Despite of this, Caravaglia et al. (2011) advocate that competition seems to 
produce positive effects on efficiency in Italian nursing-homes, mainly due to better control 
on labour costs.
Other kinds of problems make it difficult to achieve efficiency in nursing-homes, as 
barriers to real competition among providers (excessive costs of managing competition, and 
26 amadeo fuenmayor, rafael granell and maría ángeles tortosa
limitations to entry). Market based solutions could create the opposite results as those expec-
ted and the worsening on equity, as happened in Canada (Randal and Williams, 2006; Abel-
son et al., 2004; Cloutier-Fisher and Skinner, 2006). This quasi-market approach pays less 
attention to issues as equal access and equal opportunities, and the level of social trust on 
public services evaluation (Fotaki and Boyd, 2005).
In the Valencian Region, the introduction of quasi-markets has been a process of trial 
and error. Authorities have tried several measures apparently not connected, where it 
couldn’t find a political plan. Multiple financing mechanisms, together with a large regula-
tory dispersion have led the Valencian Region to a system which lacks a defined structure 
and clearly stated objectives. What does seem clear by looking at Figure 1 (see above) is that 
the financing system’s evolution has been towards marketization, first materialized with 
subsidies and vouchers, but later reached its climax with the Comprehensive Management of 
public nursing-homes and the Social Accessibility Plans.
At present the Valencian nursing-home financing system fulfils many characteristics of 
a quasi-market. Users entitled to receive benefits can choose in the request their favorite 
center (public, accessible, subsidized or voucher center) and public nursing-home funding 
will be targeted to the center selected. Nursing-homes must compete to attract the largest 
number of users and thus to obtain enough financing.
Although initially the funding system meets the basic precepts necessary for the opera-
tion of a quasi-market, it will be necessary to examine in detail the Valencian financing 
system to know if typical quasi-market targets really are achieved: promoting the freedom of 
choice by users; improving efficiency through greater competition among providers; and 
more access to nursing-homes places (Le Grand and Bartlett, 1993).
4.1. Freedom of center choice
Freedom of center choice is implemented today through the Dependency Law when 
dependent people submit an application. In this application if elderly people opt for nursing-
home care, they have to indicate three centers chosen in order of preference that can be pu-
blic, of Social Accessibility or subsidized (non-profit or municipal), disregarding those pri-
vate for-profit centers that do not benefit from the Accessibility Plan. If the applicant prefers 
one of these private nursing-homes, she has the option of requesting the CBRS. If she 
chooses this option then she must pay the difference between the price charged by the center 
and the amount of the cash benefit. In brief, elderly people considered dependent can choose 
the type of cash benefit or service they want, as well as their preferred nursing-home. Howe-
ver there are significant constraints that will limit the real possibilities of choice.
First, public information about centers and the financing system is clearly deficient12. In 
addition to the regulatory dispersion which makes the nursing-home financial system almost 
unintelligible, the Regional Government does not provide any kind of information on cen-
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ters. Indeed, there is not even a list of those that have public places. The only help available 
to elderly people when choosing a nursing-home is the information supplied by the social 
worker who is assigned to them. But the whole process of allocation of places is not trans-
parent.
The second limitation to freedom of choice may occur when the decision of the Regional 
Government does not take into account the preferences of elderly people. At times their 
chosen center may not be assigned and instead they are allocated to a center with a different 
set of characteristics. Additionally, this problem is compounded by a real lack of informa-
tion. No list is published outlining the places available in each center, nor is there a waiting 
list for those who have not been able to access the requested center. Those who are dissatis-
fied with the award by the Regional Government may ask for the CBRS, although this pos-
sibility has a different cost for the user.
The third limitation is related to the costs of selecting one kind of institution or another. 
If they opt for a public, Social Accessibility or subsidized center, they must pay the price 
mentioned above, which is related to per capita income of their household. However, if they 
prefer any other private nursing-home, then they must apply for CBRS. In this case, the price 
that the user will eventually have to pay depends on three factors: per capita household in-
come, level of dependency, and price charged by the private center selected. In other words, 
freedom of choice will be influenced by the price finally paid by the user, a price that will be 
different if they choose CBRS.
4.2. Efficiency
Quasi-markets attempt to emulate the competitive behavior of traditional markets in 
order to achieve a higher level of efficiency. In this section we analyze whether the charac-
teristics of the centers are appropriate for them to compete freely. Centers must meet a mi-
nimum of requirements to ensure a quality level of services provided, but if they have to 
compete freely, the requirements should be identical for all. In the case of the Valencian 
Region both conditions are met by regional regulations introduced in 200513. These require-
ments refer to spaces, activities and staff and are identical for all authorized nursing-homes. 
Restrictions on free competition are mainly due to the characteristics of the financing system 
and, in particular, the discriminatory treatment given to the different providers. This discri-
mination occurs at different levels:
• Centers cannot have access to the same funding mechanisms, as shown in Table 4, 
thus preventing them from competing under the same conditions. Some nursing-
homes are only eligible for one mechanism, such as public centers, while others 
have up to three different mechanisms at their disposal. Discrimination in public and 
subsidized centers can be justified by the absence of non-profit or public ownership. 
However, positive discrimination towards centers from Social Accessibility Plans 
compared to the rest of private centers is hardly justifiable.
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• Financing mechanisms set different amounts, so nursing-homes will receive a diffe-
rent daily fee per place by the Regional Government depending on the funding me-
chanism that they may choose. In the year 2012, nursing-homes that receive more 
resources per resident, on average, were Comprehensive Management public cen-
ters (€ 60.95), followed by the Social Accessibility Centers (€ 54.58). By contrast, 
the non-profit centers (both private and municipal) generally receive a lower amount 
(€ 50). But sometimes the subsidy is not the same for centers that receive the same 
financing mechanism. Comprehensive Management contracts and Social Accessibi-
lity contracts are signed individually with the companies awarded, negotiating diffe-
rent prices14.
• Public financing is not the same for all the places at the same center. If the nursing-
home is host to various public funding mechanisms, it will receive different amounts 
per place. For example, a center with subsidized places and places with vouchers 
receive € 50 for the first and a variable amount based on dependence level (between 
€ 39.47 and € 57.70) for the latter. They do not even receive the same amount in the 
same residence with the same funding system. Social Accessibility Centers will re-
ceive an amount for the initial third of their places (between € 50.86 and € 57.36) 
and a higher amount for the rest of places (€ 58.30).
To summarize, we believe that the discriminatory financial treatment given to centers 
does not allow them to compete on equal terms and to maintain a certain level of quality 
(Hardy and Wistow, 1998; Forder and Allan, 2011). According to the current model, an in-
efficient center can continue to operate if it gets an individual contract with the Regional 
Government, ensuring a higher level of funding than the rest. The efficiency of these centers 
should be adequately demonstrated by relevant economic evaluations. However, these have 
never been carried out in the Valencian region due to the lack of information.
Regardless of the discriminatory treatment mentioned, the financing system should take 
into account other problems related to supply. The greater the level of dependency of the 
elderly people the higher the service cost becomes, which should lead Regional Government 
to pay a higher price to nursing-homes that treat the most dependent users. This possibility 
was considered in the centers with vouchers and also in those with CBRS, however it does 
not exist in public, Social Accessibility or subsidized centers. Some discrimination in prices 
depending on users’ level of dependency should be applied to these centers, as centers that 
primarily serve more independent, or moderately dependent residents, receive the same fun-
ding per place as those who attend high-dependence users.
4.3. Equity
In this section we examine whether the financing system allows the same access oppor-
tunities for citizens15. From the point of view of horizontal equity, it would mean to ensure 
the same services and benefits to those who are in the same situation (Frediksson et al., 2013; 
Comas, 2012). If we analyze in detail all these funding mechanisms, we can conclude that 
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in all cases the user will receive the service at an authorized center and in return must pay 
the same price regardless of the selected center. Furthermore, this public price will be higher 
as household income increases, which gives the public price some degree of vertical equity 
(Table 3). The only exception to this uniform treatment is the CBRS. In this case, the nur-
sing-home can charge the price they want to the user who will receive the public service 
according to their degree of dependence and economic status. In some cases, it might be 
more profitable for the user to pay for a private place and receive the CBRS, and in others, 
it will be preferable to pay the public price for a place in a public or subsidized nursing-
home. This decision depends on three variables: the price charged by the private nursing-
home, the user monthly income per capita, and the degree and level of dependency accredi-
ted. Substituting these three variables by values we can find out when it will be preferable 
for the user to pay the public price or the perceived cash benefit.
In Figure 2 we see the price the user would eventually have to pay through the two avai-
lable options: public price and CBRS. Although this figure will change depending on the 
level of dependency recognized, we have chosen the case of higher dependence, which is the 
most common. It is appreciated that the public price only depends on income, while the final 
price paid in the case of cash benefit also depends on the price set by the nursing-home. For 
illustrative purposes we have considered three possible private prices, according to common 
prices in the Valencian Region: a low (€ 1,500 / month), an average (€ 1,800 / month) and a 
high (€ 2,100 / month) price.
Figure 2. Final Price for user (degree III level 2)
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The most interesting result of this graphic is where exactly the cut-off point is located, 
because from a certain level of income the CBRS becomes a better option. This cut-off is set 
at € 929, € 1,224 and € 1,524 depending on the price of the center (€ 1,500, € 1,800 
and € 2,100). These cut-off points confirm that the cash benefit provision only favors those 
elderly people who have a relatively high income level.
5. An alternative proposal
The Government report for the evaluation of the Dependency Law (Ministerio de Sani-
dad, Política Social e Igualdad, 2011) states that in Spain public contracts are sometimes 
allocated to the lower-cost proposals without analyzing the quality of services offered. Fur-
thermore, it is recommended that Central Government set a general framework of actions to 
prevent excessive heterogeneity in the allocation of public contracts and center accreditation. 
Bearing this in mind, along with the thoughts of other authors (Barriga et al., 2013; López, 
2011; León, 2011) we will make a homogeneous proposal for financing nursing-homes. 
Inevitably we must adopt a three-pronged approach to address and deal with the serious is-
sues within the nursing-home funding system in the Valencian Region: excessive complexity, 
lack of information and discrimination.
Obviously, the first step towards improvement would be the simplification of the funding 
system. At present five mechanisms of financing coexist: vouchers, public places, Social 
Accessibility, subsidized places, and finally CBRS. In order to rationalize the system and 
improve the finance of Dependency Law, we propose the unification of all financing mecha-
nisms into a single method that would work the same way for all nursing-homes, with the 
exception of the cash benefit provision, which should maintain its alternative character for 
those elderly people that cannot be cared for in public or subsidized centers. The new system 
should include both public institutions (Regional and Local Government) and the private 
(non-profit, Social Accessibility and other private nursing-homes). The only condition for 
participation of public funds would be to meet a set of quality requirements with regard to 
space, equipment, activities and staff requirements, similar to those regulated since 2005. As 
for the specific funding mechanism, there are several alternatives that have already been 
implemented in the Valencian Region: subsidies, public agreements or vouchers. Although 
any of these alternatives could be valid, the nursing-home voucher has certain advantages. 
First, it is a mechanism that has been used for 18 years and the Regional Government has 
extensive experience in its management. Second, it is a system already used by both local 
and most private nursing-homes (including social accessibility and non-profit), allowing an 
easy adaptation. Third, vouchers take into account the personal characteristics of each el-
derly person, in particular their level of dependency. Finally, with the voucher system nur-
sing-homes can be monitored to ensure they meet certain basic requirements. It is the prefe-
rred system from the perspective of competition and freedom of choice.
Another key issue that should be determined is the price paid to centers attached to the 
new system. This is surely the biggest change from the current situation. For all nursing-
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homes to compete under the same conditions, an identical price should be set for all, regard-
less of ownership in order to avoid the discrimination that exists today. However, it should 
distinguish different prices depending on each resident’s level of dependency, increasing the 
funding received by the center as the user’s dependency increases. As we discussed in the 
previous section, the voucher system is the ideal mechanism to achieve this positive discri-
mination, as here public funding clearly follows the user. To determine these prices, the most 
sensible approach would be to make a detailed study of nursing-home costs, in order to di-
fferentiate costs by level of dependency (KPMG, 2010; PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2010; 
Fernández et al., 2011; Tortosa, Fuenmayor and Granell, 2011).
A financing system such as the one proposed would also improve the quantity and qua-
lity of publicly available information. Furthermore, a list of participating centers should be 
published outlining the characteristics (ownership, facilities, services, staff, etc) of each 
provider as well as the number of places available with public funding. With this informa-
tion, users could choose the center that best suits their needs; while at the same time to im-
prove equity (Fredriksson et al., 2013). However, elderly people and their family should be 
coached by some kind of care manager to coordinate all the kinds of information they need 
to be an informed user (Meinow, Parker and Thorslund, 2011)
Of course, some centers will be more sought after than others. When demand exceeds 
the number of places in a nursing-home, some mechanism should be set up to allocate these 
places taking into account the level of need of the applicant, as in fact is the case at present 
with the nursing-home voucher. The most important thing is that this information is made 
public, so that users can choose another option or wait until there are places available in the 
center that represents their first choice.
The price paid by the user would also have to be determined. We recommend keeping the 
current system, which sets the price according to the economic status of the user rather than their 
level of dependency. Based on equity, fixing a lower price for the less dependent would clearly 
put at a disadvantage those who are in more urgent need of care. On the other hand, we think the 
public prices established in 1993 should be updated to take into account the current economic 
climate and contain a clause for automatic update according to future developments in prices.
Finally, a timeframe needs to be put in place to implement the new system. All of these 
suggested changes cannot be acted upon immediately, due to the commitments acquired by 
the Regional Government. These commitments are embodied in Comprehensive Manage-
ment contracts, which are usually fixed for a four-year period, while the contracts with 
Social Accessibility Centers were established for a 15-year period. The latter term should 
be the maximum time horizon to consider. The system should be operational as soon as 
possible, encompassing from the beginning those nursing-homes that currently use the 
voucher system as well as those that are subsidized. Subsequently, those public nursing-
homes with Comprehensive Management may join, once they have completed their present 
contracts, and finally Social Accessibility Centers should join once they finish their 15-year 
contracts agreed with the Regional Government. Finally, real political consensus is needed 
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to implement these proposals, as such a system cannot be easily altered with every change 
in government.
6. Conclusions
In this paper we have reviewed the financing of Valencian nursing-homes. The system used 
in the Valencian Region is characterized by great complexity, as it has established five possible 
means of funding: public centers (with public or private management), subsidies to non-profit 
centers, nursing-home vouchers, Social Accessibility Plans and Cash Benefit related to Resi-
dential Service (CBRS). To evaluate the performance of this funding system we have relied on 
the literature on quasi-markets, analyzing if the objectives of freedom of choice, efficiency and 
equity are adequately met. The results of the evaluation are clearly negative. Freedom of choi-
ce is conditioned by the complexity of the system, the limited information available to citizens 
and also because their preferences are not always met. Both efficiency and quality are compro-
mised because nursing-homes do not compete under the same conditions. The amount received 
by each center depends on the financing mechanism to which they have access and not the level 
of dependency of residents. Finally, equity among users would be better guaranteed by esta-
blishing a uniform price, which depends solely on the income level of residents. The only 
source of inequality would be the CBRS, which is favorable for higher income users.
In order to solve these problems, we propose a much simpler financing alternative to that 
in currently used, namely a consistent method for all centers: the nursing-home voucher. This 
new system would provide similar funding to all nursing-homes, irrespective of their charac-
teristics. However, the price should differ depending on the level of users’ dependency. As 
part of the new system, improved public information procedures are essential as well as the 
updating of the public prices. These proposed changes would undoubtedly ensure greater 
efficiency, equity and freedom of choice for all.
With all the above, our interest is to draw attention to an unbearable situation of nursing 
home funding in the Valencian Region, that could be extensible to other Spanish regions, and 
should be amended in order to a proper functioning and peaceful coexistence among provi-
ders of these services in future.
We may also stress the limitations of this study. The main problem is related to the lack 
of available information. In the case of Spain and particularly in the Valencian Region, in-
formation about nursing-homes, places and their financing is scarce and inconsistent. The 
Spanish National Audit Office stresses in its latest report the problems of information bet-
ween central and regional authorities (Tribunal de Cuentas, 2013, III.2). There is no official 
register of centers, and information about availability of places is scattered. No information 
exists about quality of centers, or satisfaction of users. It is to be hoped that the information 
provided by the Spanish and Valencian Governments will improve in future according to 
OECD (2013) recommendations in order to continue future quantitative research in this area.
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Notes
1. Ley 39/2006, de 14 de diciembre, de Promoción de la Autonomía Personal y Atención a las Personas en Si-
tuación de Dependencia (BOE n.º 299, de 15 de diciembre de 2006).
2. Statistics Service of Attached General Department of Value, Quality and Evaluation of the System to Auto-
nomy and Dependence Care, offered by Institute of Elderly and Social Services of Spain (IMSERSO, 2014)
3. Resolución de 13 de julio de 2012, de la Secretaría de Estado de Servicios Sociales e Igualdad, por la que se 
publica el Acuerdo del Consejo Territorial del Sistema para la Autonomía y Atención a la Dependencia para 
la mejora del sistema para la autonomía y atención a la dependencia (BOE n.º 185, de 3 de agosto de 2012). 
See also the Report from Tribunal de Cuentas (2014).
4. Art. 14, Ley 39/2006, de 14 de diciembre, de Promoción de la Autonomía Personal y Atención a las Personas 
en Situación de Dependencia (BOE n.º 299, de 15 diciembre de 2006).
5. Data obtained from Tribunal de Cuentas (2013), Cuadros n.º 31 and n.º 32.
6. Decreto 23/1993, de 8 de febrero, del Govern Valencià, por el que regula los precios públicos correspondientes 
a centros y servicios del Institut Valencià de Serveis Socials (DOCV n.º 1.995 de 31 de marzo de 1993).
7. Orden 14/2011, de 21 de diciembre, de la Conselleria de Justicia y Bienestar Social, por la que se regulan y 
convocan ayudas en materia de servicios sociales para el ejercicio 2012 (DOCV n.º 6.682 de 30 de diciembre 
de 2011).
8. Orden de 5 de febrero de 1996, de la Conselleria de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales, por la que se regulan y con-
vocan ayudas para financiar estancias en residencias de tercera edad mediante el sistema de bono-residencia 
(DOCV n.º 2.686 de 12 de febrero de 1996). This order is updated annually.
9. Orden 11/2011, de 16 de diciembre, de la Conselleria de Justicia y Bienestar Social, por la que se regula y 
convoca el programa para financiar estancias en residencias de tercera edad en el año 2012 (DOCV n.º 6.681 
de 29 de diciembre de 2011).
10. Acuerdo del Consell de 30 de enero de 2001. This agreement was not published, as it was a private agreement.
11. Orden de 5 de diciembre de 2007, de la Conselleria de Bienestar Social por la que se regula los requisitos y 
condiciones de acceso a las ayudas económicas del programa de atención a las personas y a sus familias en el 
marco del sistema para la autonomía y atención a la dependencia en la Comunitat Valenciana (DOCV n.º 5.656 
de 10 de diciembre de 2007).
12. Tribunal de Cuentas (2013-2104) has stressed the problems related with the information generated by the 
Dependency System, including some problems between central and regional authorities.
13. Orden de 4 de febrero de 2005, de la Conselleria de Bienestar Social, por la que se regula el régimen de auto-
rización y funcionamiento de los centros de servicios sociales especializados para la atención de personas 
mayores (DOCV n.º 4945, de 14 de febrero de 2005).
14. In 2013 and 2014 it should be stressed that regional authorities moved towards a moderate equalization in 
some of these prices.
15. There is a recent paper examining inequity in long-term care in Spain (García-Gómez et al., 2014). Unfortu-
nately, the data used does not include residential care.
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Resumen
El sistema español de cuidados de larga duración está en peligro, por ello planteamos cambiar la finan-
ciación de residencias de mayores. Utilizamos como ejemplo el extremadamente complejo sistema de 
financiación de residencias de personas mayores de la Comunidad Valenciana. En esta región, hay 
muchos mecanismos de financiación: dos tipos de subvenciones, dos planes de accesibilidad, un siste-
ma de bonos y la prestación vinculada al servicio. Evaluamos estos métodos a través de la teoría de los 
cuasi-mercados. Encontramos que estos mecanismos producen un impacto negativo en la equidad, la 
eficiencia y la libertad de elección, y proponemos un método homogéneo de financiación para todas 
las residencias de personas mayores a través de bonos.
Palabras clave: cuidados de larga duración, residencias de ancianos, cuasimercados, bonos.
Clasificación JEL: H44, H53, I38.

